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Previous research suggests that when intentions are encoded, participants establish an
attention allocation policy based on their metacognitive beliefs about how demanding
it will be to fulfill the prospective memory (PM) task. We investigated whether tacit
PM demands can influence judgments about the cognitive effort required for success,
and, as a result, affect ongoing task interference and PM performance. Participants
performed a lexical decision task in which a PM task of responding to animal words
was embedded. PM demands were tacitly manipulated by presenting participants with
either typical or atypical animal exemplars at both instructions and practice (low vs. high
tacit demands, respectively). Crucially, objective PM task demands were the same for
all participants as PM targets were always atypical animals. Tacit demands affected
participants’ attention allocation policies such that task interference was greater for
the high than low demands condition. Also, PM performance was reduced in the low
relative to the high demands condition. Participants in the low demands condition
who succeeded to the first target showed a subsequent increase in task interference,
suggesting adjustment to the higher than expected demands. This study demonstrates
that tacit information regarding the PM task can affect ongoing task processing as well
as harm PM performance when actual demands are higher than expected. Furthermore,
in line with the proposal that attention allocation is a dynamic and flexible process,
we found evidence that PM task experience can trigger changes in ongoing task
interference.
Keywords: prospective memory, attention allocation policy, task interference, tacit demands, metacognition,
anticipated demands
Prospective memory (PM) is ubiquitous in everyday life and even vital in some settings (e.g.,
remembering to remove surgical instruments from a patient before closing; Einstein and
McDaniel, 2005). When forming an intention, what information do people use to decide how
much effort they should expend to ensure that the intention will be successfully remembered? And
how capable are people in dealing with unforeseen changes to planned intentions? To illustrate, one
of the authors assumed that a pharmacy on the way home would be sufficient to cue remembering
to fill in a prescription, but this failed because the shop no longer captured attention when its neon
sign was not working.
Recent findings on the role of metacognition in PM have suggested that people’s estimates
about their likelihood of successfully fulfilling intentions are generally well calibrated, although
participants tend to be slightly underconfident about their performance (e.g., Knight et al.,
2005; Meeks et al., 2007; Schnitzspahn et al., 2011). To determine the likelihood of success,
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participants rely on metacognitive beliefs about the cognitive
demands of the entire task set (i.e., ongoing and PM activities)
and their ability to perform the upcoming tasks (Marsh et al.,
2005; Meeks et al., 2007; Einstein and McDaniel, 2008; Rummel
et al., 2013). These evaluations can influence, for example,
whether external reminders are used (Gilbert, 2015). They
can also affect the attention allocation policy established by
participants at the outset of the task, which specifies the relative
weighting of attention to the ongoing and PM tasks (Marsh
et al., 2003, 2005; Hicks et al., 2005; see also Smith, 2003;
Einstein et al., 2005). The key question in the present study was
whether available information about potential target events has
any bearing on how attentional resources are devoted to the
PM task.
Studies have shown an increase in task interference (i.e.,
slowing to the ongoing task) when PM task difficulty is increased
by changing objective task demands such as number of targets
or specificity of intentions (e.g., Hicks et al., 2005; Cohen
et al., 2008; Lourenço et al., 2013). Also, when PM tasks are
nonfocal (i.e., ongoing task processing does not direct attention
toward processing the relevant features of the target), individuals
devote extra resources to remembering the intention (e.g.,
Einstein et al., 2005; Scullin et al., 2010). Another approach
has involved manipulating anticipated task demands through
explicit instructions while leaving objective task demands intact.
For instance, instructing participants that the PM task is more
important than the ongoing task affects attention allocation
as evidenced by an increase in both task interference and
PM performance (e.g., Kliegel et al., 2004; Einstein et al.,
2005). Similarly, Rummel and Meiser (2013; Experiment 2)
showed that explicit information about the cognitive effort
necessary for fulfilling a PM task influences attention-allocation
strategies. Their manipulation of anticipated PM task demands
by instructing participants that detection of the targets will
be rather hard (vs. quite easy) significantly increased ongoing
task costs.
Moreover, Boywitt and Rummel (2012; Experiment 1)
manipulated anticipated task demands by instructing
participants that targets would be presented for only 10%
of all participants (or 90% in another condition). Using a
diffusion model analysis, the authors showed that participants
who expected the probability of target presentation to be low
were less cautious in their responding (i.e., their response
thresholds in the ongoing task were lower as revealed by
the diffusion model’s response criterion parameter). Thus,
participants’’ strategic approach to performing the ongoing task
depended on anticipated PM task demands.
We addressed the question of whether tacit PM task demands
can also affect participants’ effort and success in a nonfocal
PM task. Rather than manipulating expected PM demands
using explicit instructions—as in all prior work—we used
a categorical (nonfocal) PM task and varied the particular
target exemplars (typical vs. atypical) presented prior to the
experimental trials. We predicted that when asked to give a PM
response to animal words during an ongoing lexical decision
task (LDT), participants instructed using typical exemplars of
the target category (i.e., exemplars that are fluently processed
and easily accessible in memory; Koriat et al., 2004) would
expect to successfully accomplish the PM task with low
effort and thus display smaller ongoing task costs than those
instructed using atypical exemplars. Critically, objective task
demands were kept constant such that all PM targets presented
during the ongoing task were atypical animals. Hence, we also
predicted that participants presented with typical exemplars
at encoding would perform worse on the PM task because
successful PM performance in nonfocal tasks requires the
engagement of attention-demanding processes (e.g., Einstein
et al., 2005).
Furthermore, we investigated whether the attention allocation
policy set at the beginning is flexible such that it can be adjusted
on the basis of experience with the PM targets or whether
it is relatively immutable. Specifically, we examined whether
incongruence between expected and actual PM task demands can
lead to local changes in participants’ attention allocation policy.
We predicted that participants given typical exemplars (low
tacit PM demands) would adapt to the new demands and show
increased task interference after realizing that targets could be
atypical instances. This would provide evidence that individuals
can use their experience with the PM task to adjust their strategies
when expectations regarding the PM targets are biased.
Method
Design and Participants
The design was a 3 × 2 mixed factorial, with tacit PM demands
(high, low, none) as the between-subjects factor, and block
(baseline, PM) as the within-subjects factor. Participants were 90
undergraduate students (39 female) aged 18–23 years (M = 20.8,
SD = 1.0). Thirty participants were randomly assigned to each
of the three conditions. Testing took place individually in
sessions lasting approximately 25 min. Ethical approval was
granted by the Warwick Psychology Department’s Research
Ethics Committee and all participants provided their informed
consent.
Materials and Procedure
Participants were first told about the LDT. Instructions stated
that they had to decide as quickly and accurately as possible
whether a string of letters was a word (‘‘J’’ key press with
right index finger) or not (‘‘F’’ key press with left index
finger). Following the opportunity to ask questions, participants
performed 20 practice trials and then a baseline block (see
Table 1) consisting of 10 buffer trials and 100 lexical decision
trials (50 words and 50 nonwords).
Next, participants were told that they would perform a second
block of the LDT, and additionally given the PM instructions.
Those in the high and low tacit PM demands conditions were
given the same PM task of responding to animal words, but were
presented with different animal exemplars at both instructions
and practice. These were atypical exemplars (walrus and raccoon)
or typical exemplars (dog andmouse) in the high vs. low tacit PM
demands conditions, respectively. Specifically, participants were
instructed that if they ever saw an animal word (e.g., WALRUS or
DOG, included in brackets according to condition) they should
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TABLE 1 | Illustration of the main design and procedure for participants with high, low and none tacit prospective memory demands, with typicality of
animals indicated in italics.
Tacit PM Demands
High Low None
Baseline Block Lexical Decision Task (LDT)
PM Instructions Press “Y” to animal Press “Y” to animal —
words (e.g., WALRUS) words (e.g., DOG)
Atypical Typical
Practice (1 target) LDT + PM task LDT + PM task LDT
. . . . . .raccoon. . . . . . . . . . . .mouse. . . . . .
Atypical Typical
Delay Processing Speed Test + Questionnaire
PM Block (4 targets) LDT + PM task LDT
. . . . . . .puffin. . . . . . .gazelle. . . . . . .boar. . . . . . .hyena. . . . . . .
Atypical
press the ‘‘Y’’ key after they made their lexical decision or as soon
thereafter as they could. Participants explained the instructions
to the experimenter (to confirm their understanding) before
completing 20 practice trials, which included the presentation
of an animal word (raccoon or mouse, according to condition)
on Trial 15. To create a delay between PM task instructions
and the start of the PM block, participants completed a 2-
min test of processing speed and a demographic questionnaire.
Those in the ‘‘none’’ PM demands condition went through
the same procedure except that they did not receive the PM
task instructions. The PM block comprised 10 buffer trials and
260 lexical decision trials, of which 256 were filler trials (128
words and 128 nonwords) and 4 were PM trials. PM targets
(all atypical animals) were presented on Trials 101, 152, 203
and 254 (puffin, gazelle, boar, and hyena,1 respectively, for all
participants).
Each trial consisted of a fixation cross presented for 250 ms,
followed by the letter string in lowercase (30-pt font) until
classified as a word/nonword, and finally a waiting message until
the spacebar was pressed. Filler words in the LDT, matched with
the PM targets on mean length, syllables, and frequency, were
4–7 letters, 1–3 syllables, and HAL frequency 5.5–7.5 according
to Balota et al. (2007; nonwords with 4–7 letters were selected
from the same source). At the end of the PM block, participants
completed a questionnaire to test their recall of the intended
action. Recall was perfect for all participants.
Results
Data Screening
Two participants in the high tacit PM demands condition
who were more than 2.5 SDs from their group’s mean
1Before being debriefed, participants in the PM groups were asked to fill in
typicality ratings on a scale from 1 (very typical animal) to 5 (very atypical
animal). As expected, dog and mouse (M = 1.5, SD = 0.4) were rated as more
typical than walrus and raccoon (M = 3.9, SD = 0.6) and puffin, gazelle, boar,
and hyena (M = 3.2, SD = 0.4), and the two PM groups did not differ in their
ratings.
response time (RT) in the ongoing task were excluded. As
is commonly observed in LDTs, performance was highly
accurate with 93% of words identified correctly and no
significant differences across conditions. Based on previous PM
research (e.g., Knight et al., 2011), word RTs were trimmed
to include only correct responses to words that were less
than 2.5 SDs away from each participant’s mean. Trimming
was done separately for the baseline and PM blocks (PM
targets and the trial immediately following each of the targets
were excluded) and resulted in the elimination of 2.6% of
correct RTs.
Ongoing Task Performance
Our main question was whether tacit information about the
PM targets at instructions/practice can influence expectations
about PM task demands as reflected by task interference.
Mean RTs on filler word trials were included in a 3 × 2
mixed ANOVA with tacit PM demands (high, low, none)
as the between-subjects factor and block (baseline, PM) as
the within-subjects factor (see Figure 1 for means). Neither
main effect was significant (ps > 0.2) but the interaction
was significant, F(2,85) = 17.48, MSE = 3,731.21, p < 0.001,
ηp
2 = 0.29. We therefore conducted two further mixed 2 ×
2 (tacit PM demands × block) ANOVAs for high vs. low
PM demands conditions, and low vs. none PM demands
conditions, both yielding significant interactions (p = 0.006 and
0.003, respectively). We also divided the PM block into four
subsets (i.e., correct word trials preceding each PM target; see
Figure 2) and examined ongoing task cost for the first subset,
namely, trials occurring before the first target presentation.
The pattern of results was similar to that from the overall
task interference analysis, with a significant interaction for
the 3 × 2 ANOVA (p < 0.001), a significant interaction
for the high vs. low demands ANOVA (p < 0.002), but
this time only a marginally significant interaction for the
low vs. none demands ANOVA (p = 0.074). Therefore, in
line with our predictions, ongoing task cost was influenced
by our manipulation of tacit PM task demands such that
task interference in the low tacit demands condition was
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FIGURE 1 | Mean correct response time (RT) in milliseconds (ms) for
lexical decisions to filler words for high, low and none tacit
prospective memory (PM) demands conditions across blocks. Error
bars represent ± 1 standard error.
FIGURE 2 | Mean correct RT in milliseconds (ms) for lexical decisions
to filler words across conditions and subsets in the PM block. Error
bars represent ± 1 standard error.
significantly lower than in the high demands condition and
this was evident overall and before the first PM target
occurrence.
While actual PM task demands did not differ between
conditions, targets were consistent with expectations in the high
but not in the low demands condition. Thus an important
question is whether participants in the low demands condition
adjusted their allocation of attention when PM task demands
turned out higher than expected. To examine if task interference
changed from the first to the fourth PM block subset, we included
filler word RTs in a 3× 4 mixed ANOVAwith tacit PM demands
(high, low, none) as the between-subjects factor and PM block
subset (1–4) as the within-subjects factor (see Figure 2). There
was a significant effect of tacit PM demands, F(2,85) = 7.89,
MSE = 71,628.20, p < 0.001, ηp2 = 0.157, but no effect of
PM block subset, F(3,255) = 1.90, p = 0.13, and no interaction,
F(6,255) = 1.72, p = 0.117. Thus, RTs remained relatively stable
throughout the PM block in all conditions, suggesting that
participants in the low tacit demands condition allocated fewer
resources to the PM task and also failed to adapt to the higher
than expected attentional demands posed by the task (although
it can be seen from Figure 2 that the trend toward an interaction
reflects the resemblance of the low PM demands condition to the
none PM demands condition in the first PM block subset but to
the high PM demands condition by the fourth PM block subset).
However, of particular interest here is examination of task
interference according to success to the first target presentation
in the low tacit demands condition. Did participants who
successfully detected the first target (n = 12) show subsequently
increased task interference in comparison to those who failed
(n = 18)? We included RTs in the low tacit demands condition
in a 2 × 2 mixed ANOVA with first target (success, failure) as
the between-subjects factor and PM block subset (1 vs. 2) as the
within-subjects factor. Results revealed a significant interaction,
F(1,28) = 8.60, MSE = 64,211.91, p = 0.007, ηp2 = 0.24, such that
there was slowing from trials preceding to those succeeding the
first target when target detection was a success (Ms = 711 and
765 ms, SDs = 93 and 121, respectively; t(11) = −2.84, p = 0.016),
but not when it was a failure (Ms = 722 and 701 ms, SDs = 120
and 112, respectively; t(17) = 1.25, p = 0.230).2
PM Task Performance
Having shown that manipulation of tacit PM demands affected
attention allocation policies, we next consider whether it also
affected PM task performance. PM responses were scored as
correct if participants pressed the ‘‘Y’’ key during the target trial
or within the next trial (see Figure 3 for means). A 2 × 4 mixed
ANOVAwith tacit PM demands (high, low) and PM target (1–4)
as between- and within-subjects factors revealed an effect of tacit
PM demands, F(1,56) = 8.34, MSE = 0.44, p = 0.006, ηp2 = 0.13,
such that PM performance was significantly better with high than
with low tacit demands (0.64 vs. 0.39) with no other significant
effects (both ps> 0.3).
Discussion
Our data show that tacit PM task demands can affect participants’
effort and success in a PM task. Specifically, those given typical
exemplars at encoding (low tacit demands condition) showed
less task interference and worse PM performance than those
given atypical ones, demonstrating that indirectly conveyed
information about PM task difficulty (i.e., examples of targets at
encoding) affects expectations about PM demands and thereby
the amount of attention allocated to the intention. Crucially,
our results also demonstrate that, although biased expectations
2Some readers might be concerned that this pattern could also be explained
by monitoring being reinstated following detection of the first target (cf.
Scullin et al., 2010, 2013). We therefore repeated this analysis while also
including tacit PM demands (high, low) as a between-subjects factor.
Although there was a reduced number of participants (six) missing the
first target in the high demands condition, the three-way interaction was
marginally significant, F(1,54) = 2.83,MSE = 3,108.34, p = 0.098, ηp2 = 0.05. In
the high tacit demands condition (contrary to the low) there was no greater
slowing from trials preceding to those succeeding the first target when target
detection was successful (791 to 799 ms) relative to when it was unsuccessful
(847 to 859 ms). These data are consistent with our interpretation of the
results as reflecting an adjustment of the attention allocation policy following
realization that targets could be atypical exemplars.
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FIGURE 3 | Mean proportion correct for the PM task across conditions
for each of the four PM targets. Error bars represent ± 1 standard error.
can harm PM performance when actual demands turn out
higher than expected, participants can adapt following target
experience. In other words, the present results show that
individuals can adjust attention-allocation strategies following
successful detection of a target that is incongruent with their
(biased) metacognitive expectations.
The present study provides novel evidence that detecting
PM targets that are inconsistent with tacit demands can elicit
local changes in attention allocation. Specifically, participants
in the low tacit demands condition who detected the first PM
target (hence realizing that targets could be atypical exemplars)
showed an increase in ongoing task RTs following this first
target and also went on to perform similarly to those in the
high tacit demands condition (0.67 vs. 0.64 success to Target
2). This extends previous research showing that individuals can
adjust the amount of attention devoted to the intention when
monitoring goes unreinforced due to the lack of PM target
occurrences (e.g., Loft et al., 2008; Scullin et al., 2010; cf. Boywitt
and Rummel, 2012), and also that trial-by-trial changes in the
allocation of attention can occur. For example, task interference
can change flexibly as a result of changes in the effort toward
an ongoing task (Marsh et al., 2005) or an item’s relevance for
the PM task (e.g., Marsh et al., 2006; Lourenço and Maylor,
2014). The present results provide support for the proposal
that attention allocation is flexible (Scullin et al., 2013), such
that experience with the ongoing and the PM task can also
change the policy over time (Hicks et al., 2005; Marsh et al.,
2005). Interestingly, Kuhlmann and Rummel (2014) recently
showed that individuals can also flexibly update their attention-
allocation policy after initial intention encoding as a result of
learning during the ongoing task which trials are PM-relevant.
Thus, these authors showed that participants who knew that PM
cues would only occur in a sub-set of trials were able to learn
which trials were PM-relevant as demonstrated by a reduction
in ongoing cost for PM-irrelevant trials (see also Lourenço et al.,
2013).
In addition, we presented participants with an atypical/typical
category exemplar at both instructions and practice. Previous
research suggests that learners’ metacognitive beliefs about
how item characteristics affect memorability are sensitive to
task experience (e.g., Tullis and Benjamin, 2012). By analogy,
we assume that intention retrieval during practice may have
strengthened participants’ beliefs about the difficulty/ease of
successfully fulfilling the intention. Particularly in laboratory
settings this might provide participants with additional
information on which to base their expectations about PM
demands since they lack prior experience with the PM task (cf.
Rummel and Meiser, 2013). Future research could examine
whether target exemplars presented at instructions (i.e., at
the time of intention formation) guide attention allocation or
whether metacognitive beliefs about the difficulty of completing
the PM task are also determined by direct task experience during
practice. Although the present study does not isolate the locus of
the effect more precisely, it does demonstrate that information
about particular target exemplars influences metacognitive
expectations and thereby the amount of attention devoted to a
categorical intention and task interference.
We argued that worse PM performance in the low relative
to the high tacit demands condition was due to differences in
attention allocation policies. Alternatively, it could be claimed
that worse PM performance in the low demands condition
(typical exemplars at encoding) was due to the mismatch
between encoding and retrieval contexts (Tulving and Thomson,
1973). Participants might have generated animal exemplars at
encoding (Ellis and Milne, 1996) and, because all PM targets
were atypical animals, doing so would facilitate recognition of
targets for individuals in the high demands condition only.
Even if we assume that participants spontaneously generated
category exemplars at encoding, and that in the high demands
condition these were the same items later presented, the context
matching account is inconsistent with our observation that
tacit demands affected task interference prior to any target
occurrence. If participants disregarded the information about
the target exemplars when allocating attention to the PM task,
there should have been no difference in the representation of
the intention in memory and, accordingly, no cost differences
between low and high tacit demands conditions. Therefore, the
most parsimonious explanation of the results is that reduced PM
performance for the low demands condition was primarily due to
participants allocating insufficient resources to meet actual task
demands.
Finally, note that by tacit demands we mean that we did
not, at any point, directly instruct participants with respect
to the demands of the PM task. Instead, demands were
conveyed indirectly by providing participants with particular
exemplars of PM targets before ongoing task performance.
We are not claiming that the effect of target exemplars on
attention allocation occurred without individuals’ conscious
apprehension, although we acknowledge that this is a possibility.
As proposed by Hicks et al. (2005, p. 442) ‘‘[t]he setting of an
initial attentional allocation policy need not be conscious, but
may represent a metacognitive strategy about how to approach
the entire task set, and therefore, not necessarily be accessible to
conscious awareness’’.
In conclusion, three key aspects of the present study
distinguish it from previous research. First, we manipulated
tacit demands about the PM task. Second, objective PM task
demands were the same for all participants. Third, for some
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participants tacit and actual PM demands were incongruent but
participants were never explicitly warned about such change. Our
findings suggest that in studying attention allocation policies and
their impact on task interference in PM tasks it is important to
consider the role of tacit information about PM task demands
(e.g., as conveyed by specific target exemplars at encoding). Such
information can influence individuals’ beliefs about the ease of
fulfilling a PM task, as evidenced by its effect on ongoing task
processing, and can harm PMperformance when actual demands
turn out higher than expected.
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